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Abstract
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every
competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous
commodity taxes that cause prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. The argument can be extended to
economies with strategic interactions, incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations
might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities.
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Introduction

It is a curious fact that most policy makers regard taxes as bad, while at the
same time they recognize the existence of widespread externalities. In this
paper we try to make the case that there is almost always a tax package that
is good for everybody.
The classical theorems of welfare economics, formulated definitively in
Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1951), established the equivalence between competitive equilibrium allocations and Pareto optimal allocations in economies
without externalities. When there are externalities, private costs and social
costs diﬀer, and competitive equilibria are not likely to be Pareto eﬃcient.
Agents will typically make poor social choices, for example, smoking too
much or driving too much, because they do not take into account the cost
they impose on bystanders who must inhale their smoke or exhaust fumes,
not to mention getting crowded out of highway space. Lindahl (1919) and
Pigou (1920, 1932) famously argued that taxes could be an appropriate antidote to the socially false incentives provided by competitive prices, because
if the taxes were set equal to the external cost imposed on third parties,
then agents would eﬀectively internalize the externality, taking into account
the cost they imposed on others. Despite general familiarity with Pigouvian
taxation, policy makers have not embraced the concept of "good taxes". We
believe there are at least three reasons.
In the first place, any one tax hurts some people while helping others.
The bystander does not have to breathe as much noxious air, but the smoker
must pay a tax and not enjoy as many cigarettes. Unless one is prepared
to make interpersonal utility comparisons, valuing bystanders’ utilities more
than smokers’ utilities, the Pigouvian observation about divergent private
and social costs is not an argument by itself for taxation.
Second, if Pigouvian taxation is taken to its logical conclusion, then diﬀerent individuals should face diﬀerent tax rates for the same good. (A smoker
who always lights up outdoors should pay less tax than his brother who only
smokes in crowded restaurants, because he causes less damage.) This idea
was elaborated in Lindahl (1919, 1928), Samuelson (1954), Coase (1960), and
Arrow (1970). In "Lindahl equilibrium", Pareto eﬃciency is indeed achieved
by charging diﬀerent taxes for the same good, depending on the buyer. Furthermore, combining these individual specific taxes with a carefully chosen
program of individually targeted income redistribution (often exceeding the
revenue raised by the taxes) can achieve allocations that Pareto dominate
1

purely competitive equilibrium. But such detailed, and discriminatory, interventions seem hopelessly complicated, and possibly illegal.
Third, even if it were practical to implement a plan that taxed and redistributed on a person specific basis, how would the tax authorities ever know
which individuals to charge the higher taxes? As Arrow (1970) pointed out,
Lindahl equilibrium does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
of Hurwicz (1972), since it is not in the interest of individuals to reveal the
information necessary for the price mechanism to function.
In this paper we suppose that the social planner can discover the population distribution of household types (say a continuum of each of I > 1 types of
households, where a type defines an agent’s preferences, endowments, and the
externalities his consumption generates). The planner does not need to know
which agent is of which type. We also suppose there are more commodities L
than household types, L > I. We show that for almost all externalities, there
is a way to make everybody better oﬀ than they would be under perfect competition by taxing or subsidizing commodities anonymously (everyone pays
the same tax) and redistributing the tax revenue anonymously (each household gets the same rebate, independent of their income or how much they
spent or what taxes they paid). It is not necessary to make interpersonal
utility comparisons to see that this tax package is better than laissez faire,
taxes do not need to be individual specific, and the central planner needs to
know about population characteristics and not about individuals.
Our proof introduces the standard techniques of diﬀerential topology,
used so often in general equilibrium theory, into public finance, where the
techniques have seldom been applied.
The theorem does not address several important questions. It does not say
how big the taxes could be, and thus how much revenue they could generate,
and still Pareto improve on laissez faire. Taxes in modern economies are
quite high, and have potentially large incentive eﬀects. One message of our
theorem is that it might be useful to consider how much of this revenue
could be raised through a package of "good taxes" that raise welfare instead
of simple income taxes that might discourage work.
The theorem compares welfare at competitive equilibrium (with no taxes)
to equilibrium after the "good tax package" has been implemented. It does
not examine whether starting from a situation with an income tax, it is
always possible to find a tax package raising the same revenue but making
everyone better oﬀ.
The theorem considers only separable externalities, which do not aﬀect
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any agent’s marginal rate of substitution between goods. Moreover, the theorem is proven for almost all externalities. It is possible that a deeper analysis
might show that for any nontrivial (separable or nonseparable) externality,
some tax package could be found to Pareto improve on competitive equilibrium. Economies that allow for strategic interactions generalize economies
with externalities. It would then be an immediate extension of the deeper
argument to show that, with strategic interactions, generically, there are
commodity taxes that lead to Pareto improvement in welfare.
Our theorem also does not suggest how the social planner might come
to know the distribution of agent types in the population. But that is a far
smaller information burden than knowing the type of every individual.
The demonstration that competitive equilibria in economies with externalities are constrained suboptimal makes an important methodological
point. Tax intervention is often said to be counterproductive because competitive equilibrium cannot be Pareto improved by anonymous taxes. Since
externalities are ubiquitous, our theorem shows that such a view is untenable. Tax intervention may be counterproductive because the fiscal authority
does not know enough about the population distribution of tastes and endowments to set the right taxes and subsidies, but not because there are no
beneficial taxes and subsidies. The argument shows that such taxes exist; it
does not indicate how to compute them.
An alternative approach would be to ask which allocations can be implemented as strategic equilibria, through the design of mechanisms and an
explicit recognition of incentive compatibility constraints, as introduced by
Hurwicz (1973, 1979) or, in an abstract setting, by Maskin (1999) and developed in the theory of contracts. We have eschewed this approach in order
to focus on the functioning of competitive, anonymous markets. We have
in eﬀect severely constrained the kinds of interventions that a policy maker
could use, and yet we still prove the existence of Pareto improving taxes.
Work in public finance, starting with Ramsey (1927), and developed in
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond (1975) characterized second-best
commodity taxes in the presence of public goods or in the absence of lumpsum transfers; Guesnerie (1977) posed the problem from the perspective of
tax reform. Importantly, this work did not provide suﬃcient conditions,
stated in terms of fundamentals, i.e. preferences and endowments, for commodity taxes to Pareto improve over non-intervention; the argument here
establishes that, under regularity conditions, this is generically the case.
While our question of the existence of Pareto improving taxes, constrained
3

to be anonymous, does not seem to have been posed in precisely our form
for externalities, the analogous question when externalities are replaced by
incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information has been analyzed repeatedly.
With uncertainty and an incomplete asset market, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) proved the constrained suboptimality of competitive equilibrium allocations: generically, there is a reallocation of assets that leads to
a Pareto superior allocations of goods after prices in commodity spot markets
adjust and markets clear. This phenomenon had been illustrated (but not
proved) in Stiglitz (1982), while Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) refined
the proof. Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001) showed that taxation,
which is anonymous, could induce a Pareto improving reallocation of assets.
The Pareto improving possibilities generated by the taxation of exchanges
in economies with asymmetric information was introduced by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1986). Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1997), and later Bisin,
Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (2002), showed that many
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, including the adverse selection
problem described in Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and
the moral hazard phenomena described in Mirrlees (1977), could be recast in
a more standard general equilibrium context with two changes: promises by
diﬀerent agents are pooled together, and the deliveries each agent makes are
an option for him. Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis
(2002) showed that, generically, the anonymous taxation of these contracts
can eﬀect a Pareto improvement.
In this prior work on constrained ineﬃciency it was possible to confront
directly the question of how the central planner could discover enough about
the characteristics of the agents to find the right tax rates. Even when the asset market is incomplete, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) showed that
the utility function of an individual can be identified from his demand function for commodities and assets; recently, Kubler, Chiappori, Ekeland and
Polemarchakis (2002) extended the argument to show that every individual
utility can be obtained from aggregate demand or the graph of the equilibrium correspondence as the allocation of endowments varies. For economies
with a public good, Snyder (1977) obtained results concerning restrictions on
the market behavior of optimizing individuals, but Carvajal (2002) showed
that the results do not generalize.
Unfortunately the separable externalities we assume in this paper do not
have observable consequences for agent demands, so we must leave open the
4

question of how the central planner could discover the size of the externalities
one man’s consumption inflicts on others.

2

The economy

Household types are represented by individuals i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}, and
commodities by ∈ L = {1, ..., L}. We imagine a continuum of individuals
of each type i.
For any individual i ∈ I, we denote a non-negative consumption bundle
by xi = (xi1 , . . . , xil , . . . xiL ) ∈ RL+ ; across individuals, we denote an allocation
of commodities by x = (x1 , . . . , xi , . . . xI ) ∈ RLI
+ . When we wish to emphasize
the consumption of some individual i, we write x = (xi , x−i ), where x−i =
(xh : h = 1, . . . , I, h 6= i) is the complementary allocation.
An individual is described by his utility function and endowment. His
utility function ui : RLI
+ → R has domain the set of allocations. The dependence of ui on x−i is what we mean by an externality, since in competitive
equilibrium individual i has no control over x−i and yet his utility depends
on it. His endowment is a vector of goods ei ∈ RL++ , a consumption bundle.
Across individuals, the profile of utility functions is u = (u1 , . . . , ui , . . . , uI ),
and the allocation of endowments is e = (e1 . . . , ei , . . . , eI ). The pair (u, e)
defines an economy.
P
The aggregatePendowment is e = i ei . At an allocation, aggregate consumption is x = i xi , and the allocation is feasible if x = e.
The profile of utilities at an allocation is u(x) = (u1 (x1 ), . . . , ui (xi ),
. . . , uI (xI )). An allocation, x1 , is Pareto superior to another, x2 , if u(x1 ) >
u(x2 ); a feasible allocation is Pareto optimal if a Pareto superior feasible
allocation does not exist.
Prices of commodities are denoted by p = (p1 , . . . , pl , . . . pL ) ∈ RL+ , and
commodity tax rates by (t1 , . . . , tl , . . . tL ) ∈ RL ; prices are positive, but tax
rates may be negative – tl < 0 is a subsidy. We shall always regard a tax
as levied on the buyers, so that a commodity with price p and tax rate t
costs any buyer p + t , but brings revenue of only p to the seller. Lump-sum
transfers of revenue are determined by a single scalar τ ∈ R representing the
transfer to each individual. The transfer can be positive or negative. Taxes
and transfers are anonymous.
An individual regards the transfer of revenue that he receives as independent of the commodity taxes that he pays.
5

At prices p and tax rates t and revenue τ and complementary allocation
x , the optimization problem of an individual i ∈ I is
−i

maxx∈RL+ ui (x, x−i )
s.t (p + t) · (x − ei )+ − p · (x − ei )− ≤ τ
The solution to the optimization problem is xi (p, t, τ , x−i , ei ).
Given an economy (u, e) and tax rates t, a competitive t-equilibrium consists of prices andP
a feasible allocation, (p, x), such that xi ∈ xi (p, t, τ , x−i , ei ),
where τ = (1/I) i t · (xi − ei )+ is the per capita share of the tax revenue
P
i
i
i t · (x − e )+ .
A competitive equilibrium is a competitive t-equilibrium at tax rates t =
0.
A feasible allocation is constrained Pareto suboptimal if there exists a tax
package t and a Pareto superior competitive t-equilibrium allocation.
The purpose of the paper is to prove the following theorem, whose terms
will be made formally precise in the next sections.
Theorem For almost all economies with separable externalities and L > I,
every competitive equilibrium is constrained Pareto suboptimal; that is, for
each competitive equilibrium, there exists an anonymous tax package t and a
competitive t-equilibrium allocation which Pareto dominates it.

3

Walrasian equilibria

An economy is Walrasian if there are no external eﬀects: for every individual,
the utility function, ui , is independent of the complementary allocation, x−i ,
and there are no taxes or transfers: t = 0 and τ = 0. For such economies it
is notationally easier to take the domain of ui to be simply RL+ .
A Walrasian economy is smooth if, for every individual i ∈ I,
1. the utility function, ui , is continuous, strictly monotonically increasing
and strictly quasi-concave;
2. in the interior of its domain of definition, the utility function is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, diﬀerentiably strictly monotonically increasing: Dui À 0, and diﬀerentiably strictly quasi concave: y 0 Dui = 0 ⇒
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y 0 (Dui )y < 0, for y 6= 0; along any sequence (xin : n = 1, . . .), with
limn→∞ xin = xi a consumption bundle on the boundary, limn→∞ =
kDui (xin )k−1 Dui (xin ) · xin = 0;
3. the endowment is strictly positive: ei À 0.
From now on we fix L > I > 1, and u∗ = (u∗1 , ..., u∗i , ..., u∗I ) satisfying
1 − 2 above. The set of economies, E, is then parameterized by the allocation
of endowments, e; E = RLI
++ is an open set in Euclidean space of dimension
LI. A property holds for "almost all" economies or "generically" if it holds
for an open set E 0 ⊂ E of economies whose complement E\E 0 has Lebesgue
measure zero. We call the set E 0 generic or say it has full Lebesgue measure.
We now quickly review the main properties of competitive equilibrium
for Walrasian economies. These were established by Debreu in 1970.
With no taxes or income transfers or externalities, the optimization problem of the individual i ∈ I is
maxxi ∈RL+ ui (xi )
s.t p · (xi − ei ) ≤ 0.

The solution to the optimization problem of the individual exists and
is unique, and is denoted by xi (p, ei ). The excess demand function of the
individual, z i , is defined by z i (p, ei ) = xi (p, ei ) − ei .
The individual excess demand function is continuously diﬀerentiable, and
it satisfies homogeneity of degree 0 in prices: z i (kp, ei ) = z i (p, ei ), for k > 0,
and Walras’ law: p · z i (p, ei ) = 0; also, along any sequence (pn : n = 1, . . .),
with limn→∞ = p on the boundary of the strictly positive domain, limn→∞ =
kz i (pn , ei )k = ∞ 1 .
A Walrasian equilibrium consists of prices and a feasible allocation, (p, x),
such that xi ∈ xi (p, ei ), for every individual.
Since the utility functions of individuals are strictly monotonically increasing, it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to strictly positive prices: p À 0.
By homogeneity it also suﬃces to restrict attention to equilibrium prices
p = (p1 , . . . , pL−1 , 1) for which commodity l = L is numéraire.
P
The aggregate excess demand function, z, is defined by z(p, e) = i z i (p,
ei ); it inherits the continuous diﬀerentiability of the excess demand functions
1

Debreu (1972, 1976).
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of individuals, and it satisfies homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras’ law;
along any sequence (pn : n = 1, . . .), with limn→∞ = p on the boundary of
the strictly positive domain, limn→∞ = kz(pn , e)k = ∞.
i
The truncated excess demand of an individual is ẑ i = (z1i , . . . , zL−1
); it
is the demand for commodities other than the numéraire. Similarly, the
truncated excess demand for the economy is ẑ = (z1 , . . . , zL−1 ).
For an economy, e, we write ẑe (p) = ẑ(p, e). Walrasian equilibrium prices
satisfy ẑe (p) = 0. Conversely, by Walras Law, any price vector p satisfying
ẑe (p) = 0 is part of a Walrasian equilibrium.
An equilibrium (p, x) for the economy e is called regular if dim[Dẑe (p)] =
L − 1. The economy e itself is called regular if all its equilibria are regular,
that is, if ẑe (p) = 0 ⇒ dim[Dẑe (p)] = L − 1. We sometimes denote this
situation by ẑe t 0. From the boundary behavior of the truncated excess
demand function, it follows that the set of Walrasian equilibria for a regular
economy is finite and varies smoothly with the allocation of endowments 2 .
A theorem of Arrow and Debreu (1954) assures us that equilibrium prices
exist for every economy. The following theorem is essentially due to Debreu
(1970).
Debreu’s Theorem The set of regular economies is generic.
Proof: Let us first see that dim[Dẑe1 (p, e)] = L−1. For any commodity
1 ≤ < L, consider the infinitesimal variation in endowments δ 1 defined by
decreasing e1l by 1 unit, increasing e1L by (pl /pL ) units and leaving all other
endowments unchanged. Evidently, the income and demand of individual 1
is unaﬀected by the perturbation δ 1 , and, as a consequence, ∂z 1 /∂δ 1 = 1;
the excess demand of individual 1 for all commodities other than l or the
numéraire, as well as the excess demand of every individual, are unaﬀected
by the perturbation. It follows that ∂z /∂δ 1 = 1 and ∂ ẑk1 /∂δ 1 = 0 for all
k 6= , L. As a consequence, dim[Dẑ(p, e)] = L − 1 or, equivalently, ẑ t 0. By
the transversal density theorem 3 , there exists a set of full Lebesgue measure
of regular economies E0 ⊂ E such that, ẑe t 0 whenever e ∈ E0 .¥
At a Walrasian equilibrium, the profile of marginal utilities of revenue,
μ = (μ1 , . . . , μi , . . . , μI ), is determined by μi = (∂ui /∂xiL )(xi ).
2
3

Debreu (1970).
Abraham and Robin (1967, thm. 19.1)
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Using these marginal utilities of income we can define equilibrium for an
economy e as a triple (x, μ, p) satisfying the equations Fe (x, μ, p) = 0 where
L−1
→ R(L+1)I × RL−1
Fe : (RL++ × R++ )I × R++

is defined by

⎛

..
.

⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜ Du∗i (xi ) − μi (p + ti )
⎜
⎜
⎜
p · (xi − ei )
Fe (x, μ, p) = ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
..
⎜
.
⎜
⎝
P i
i
i (x̂ − ê )

It is easy to show that ẑe t 0 if and only if Fe t 0.

3.1

⎞

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟,
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

Trade at equilibrium

At prices of commodities, p, an individual, i, trades a commodity, l, if
xil (p, ei ) 6= eil .
Lemma 1. Suppose we restrict attention to heterogenous economies for which
I ≥ 2, and L ≥ 2. Then, generically, at every Walrasian equilibrium, every
individual trades every commodity.
Proof Fix an individual h ∈ I and a commodity k ∈ L; by renumbering
commodities we can take k 6= L, and by renumbering individuals we can take
h 6= 1.
By definition, the truncated individual excess demand function consists
of the excess demand for the (L − 1) commodities other than the numéraire,
l = L, and the price of the numéraire commodity is set at pL = 1.
The function
LI
L−1
Fkh : RL−1
× R,
++ × R++ → R
is defined by

⎛

Fkh (p, e) = ⎝
9

ẑ(p, e)
ẑkh (p, ei )

⎞

⎠.

The Jacobian matrix De1 ẑ(p, e) has rank L − 1, (as we saw in the proof of
Debreu’s theorem), while De1 ẑkh (p, e) = 0, since h 6= 1. But by exactly that
same argument in Debreu’s theorem, there is an infinitesimal variation, δ hk in
the endowments of agent h such that Dδhk ẑkh (p, e) = 1. It follows that
⎞
⎛
De1 ẑ Dδhk ẑ
⎠
(De1 Fkh , Dδhk Fkh ) = ⎝
0
1

has rank L. Since all the columns of this matrix are linear combinations of
columns of the matrix De Fkh , this Jacobian matrix, evaluated at any point
(p, e) with ẑ(p, e) = 0, has rank L, and, as a consequence, Fkh t 0.
By the transversal density theorem and the boundary behavior of the
excess demand function, there is an open set Ekh ⊂ E of endowments of full
Lebesgue measure such that for allocations of endowments, e ∈ Ekh , (Fkh )e t 0.
h
But (Fkh )e t 0 only if (Fkh )−1
e (0) = ∅, since the domain of (Fk )e has dimension
L − 1, while the range has dimension L.
For e ∈ Ekh , there are no prices of commodities such that markets clear,
ẑ(p, e) = 0, while individual h does not trade in commodity k, zkh (p, e) = 0.
The set of economies E1 = ∩h ∩k Ekh has the desired property: for any
allocation of endowments e ∈ E1 , at every Walrasian equilibrium, every individual trades every commodity.
¥

Since the set of regular economies, E0 , is open and of full Lebesgue measure, the set
E ∗ = E0 ∩ E1

of regular economies with the property that, at every Walrasian equilibrium,
every individual trades every every commodity, is open and of full Lebesgue
measure.
We will restrict attention to this generic set E ∗ of regular economies with
full trade.

4

Taxes and transfers

Now we return to the case where there are taxes, but we retain our hypothesis
that there are no external eﬀects: for every individual, the utility function,
ui , is independent of the complementary allocation, x−i . Hence we think of
utility as fixed exactly as in the Walrasian case as a function u∗i : RL+ → R.
10

Recall that individuals are taxed tl for purchasing a unit of commodity
l; the tax tl is a mark-up or a subsidy to a buyer of the commodity, but it
leaves a seller unaﬀected. Fiscal revenue is returned to individuals in equal
amounts, τ . Thus taxes and transfers are anonymous. Also, every individual
regards the transfer of revenue that he receives independent of the commodity
taxes he pays.
At prices p and tax rates t and revenue τ , the optimization problem of
an individual is
maxxi ∈RL+ ui (x∗i )
s.t (p + t) · (xi − ei )+ − p · (xi − ei )− ≤ τ .
The solution xi (p, t, τ , ei ), to the optimization problem, defines the demand correspondence of the individual. The budget set is kinked at the
endowment point, and when there is a subsidy instead of a tax, so some
tl < 0, the budget set is not even convex. Thus in general we cannot be sure
that xi (p, t, τ , ei ) is diﬀerentiable, or even single-valued. But in fact it is, for
small taxes and prices at which there is trade in every commodity.
Suppose that at prices p∗ , and taxes t = 0, and revenue τ = 0, the
individual trades every commodity; that is, suppose his Walrasian demand
at p∗ diﬀers from his endowment, xil (p∗ , ei ) 6= eil for all ∈ L. For any tax
package t = (t1 , . . . , tl , . . . , tL ), define ti = (ti1 , . . . , til , . . . , tiL ), where
⎧
⎨ tl if xil (p∗ , ei ) > eil
til (p∗ , t) =
⎩
0 if xil (p∗ , ei ) < eil
Since the utility function is strictly quasi-concave, it follows that for all
p near enough to p∗ , and t near enough to 0, and τ near enough to 0, the
following two budget sets lead to the same choices
xi ∈ arg max{u∗i (xi ) : (p + t) · (xi − ei )+ − p · (xi − ei )− ≤ τ }

⇔

xi ∈ arg max{u∗i (xi ) : (p + ti ) · (xi − ei ) ≤ τ , }
The reason is that the non-overlapping parts of the budget sets contain only
points x for which u∗i (x) < u∗i (xi (p∗ , ei )) by a big gap, and hence are irrelevant to the maximization problem, as long as commodity taxes, t, and
transfers, τ , are close enough to 0, and p is near to p∗ . The advantage of the
11

second budget set is that it is linear in xi , and hence behaves like a Walrasian
budget set. Furthermore, for fixed p∗ , til (p∗ , t) is obviously a smooth function
of t.
Since the Walrasian demand function, xi (p, ei ), is smooth in (p, ei ), the demand function with commodity taxes and transfers of revenue, xi (p, t, τ , ei ),
is smooth for p near enough to p∗ and t and τ i small enough; in particular it
is smooth at (p, t, τ ) = (p∗ , 0, 0).
Recall that in a competitive t-equilibrium, the fiscal authority must calculate the fiscal revenue that must be redistributed. The tax rebate itself
aﬀects spending across commodities and, consequently, fiscal revenue. The
fiscal authority must foresee the change in spending and announce anonymous
lump-sum transfers that coincide with the fiscal revenue that will ensue. So it
is not obvious that a competitive t-equilibrium exists. The following Lemma
shows that in an economy with a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full
trade, tax equilibrium also exists for small enough taxes.
Lemma 2. Let e be a regular Walrasian economy (with no externalities).
If (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ ) is a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, then there
exists an open set, U ⊂ RL , with 0 ∈ U, and smooth functions x̃i : U → RL++ ,
L−1
p̃ : U → R++
, and τ̃ : U → R, such that, (x̃(0), p̃(0), τ̃ (0)) = (x∗ , p∗ , 0) and
for all t ∈ U,
P i
i x̃ (t) = e,
τ̃ (t) =

1
I

P

i

t · (x̃i (t) − ei )+ ,

x̃i (t) = xi (p(t), t, τ̃ (t), ei ).
Proof The first order, market clearing, and fiscal balance conditions
L
(L+1)I
× RL−1
Fe : (RL++ × R++ )I × RL−1
++ × R × R → R

and
L
Re : (RL++ × R++ )I × RL−1
++ × R × R → R

12

are defined by
⎛

and

..
.

⎜
⎜
⎜
Du∗i (xi ) − μi (p + ti )
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
Fe (x, μ, p, τ , t) = ⎜ (p + ti (p∗ , t)) · (xi − ei ) − τ
⎜
⎜
⎜
..
⎜
.
⎜
⎝
P i
i
i (x̂ − ê )
Re (x, μ, p, τ , t) = τ −

⎞

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟,
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

1X i ∗
t (p , t) · (xi − ei ).
I i

By hypothesis there is full trade xil (p, ei ) 6= eil for all i, , and, as a consequence, ti is a smooth function of t. It follows that Fe is smooth. Furthermore,
for xi near x∗i , ti (p∗ , t)) · (xi − ei ) = t · (xi − ei )+
Clearly Fe (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0) = 0, since with t = 0 and τ = 0, the function Fe simply recapitulates the standard Walrasian equilibrium conditions.
Similarly, a solution (x, μ, p, τ ) to Fe (x, μ, p, τ , t) = 0 is a competitive tequilibrium, if t is small enough. The endogenous Walrasian variables are η =
(L+1)I
∗ ∗
∗
(x, μ, p) ∈ R++ × RL−1
++ . At the regular Walrasian equilibrium (x , μ , p ),
Dη Fe (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0)
is, by the definition of regularity, a square matrix with full rank, (L + 1)I +
L − 1. When tax rates are zero, changing consumption or marginal utilities
or prices does not aﬀect tax revenue, hence
Dη Re (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0) = 0,

and Dτ Re (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0) = 1.

It follows that the Jacobian matrix
⎞
⎞ ⎛
⎛
Dη Fe (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0) Dτ Fe (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0)
Dη Fe (x∗ , μ∗ , p∗ , 0, 0) ?
⎠
⎠=⎝
⎝
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗
∗
Dη Re (x , μ , p , 0, 0) Dτ Re (x , μ , p , 0, 0)
0
1
has full rank, (L + 1)I + (L − 1) + 1.
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Using (η, τ ) as endogenous variables and t as exogenous variables, the implicit function theorem guarantees the existence of competitive t-equilibrium
in a neighborhood of t = 0, as a function of the tax rates on commodities. ¥
We are now ready to establish the crucial step in our proof. When there
are no externalities, taxes help some people and hurt others. But with externalities, a tax can change the choices of some individual h, and thereby
improve the utility of another individual i. We first establish that by changing
taxes, the fiscal authority can produce a rich array of changes in consumption
choices. Those changes will later be used to eﬀect beneficial externalities.
We will not impose taxes on the last, numeraire, commodity: tL = 0.
Thus we confine attention to infinitesimal tax rates dt = (dt1 , . . . , dtL−1 ).
The reason is that, in general, taxation of all the commodities, including
the numéraire commodity, may not achieve anything more than taxing just
the first L − 1 commodities. That is the reason we needed to assume L > I.
Corollary 1. At a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, the matrix
⎞
⎛ 1
x̃1
x̃11
·
·
·
dtL−1
⎟
⎜ dt1
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ .
.
⎜ ..
.. ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ x̃1L
x̃1L
⎟
⎜ dt · · · dt
L−1 ⎟
⎜ 1
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎜
.. ⎟
Dt x̃ = ⎜ ...
. ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ x̃I
I
x̃
⎟
⎜ 1 ···
1
⎜ dt1
dtL−1 ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜ .
.
⎜ ..
.. ⎟
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎠
⎝ I
x̃L
x̃IL
· · · dtL−1
dt1

has full column rank, L − 1.

Proof If not, there would exist dt, such that
dx̃i = Dt x̃i dt = 0,
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for all i.

If consumption does not change, and pL is fixed at 1, and tL is fixed at 0,
it follows from the first-order conditions for each individual for commodity
l = L that μi does not change either: dμi = Dt μi dt = 0. From the first
coordinates of the function Fe , it follows, then, that for any commodity,
l 6= L, for which some individual i is a buyer, that dpl +dti = Dt pl dt+dtl = 0.
Similarly, for any commodity, l 6= L, for which some individual j is a seller,
it follows that dpl = Dt pl dt = 0. Since every commodity has both a buyer
and a seller, dtl = 0 for all l 6= L, i.e.dt = 0, a contradiction.
¥.
In the next Corollary, we show that for any commodity 6= L and any
agent i we could imagine externalities on i such that increasing the tax on
good would lead to changes in consumption by agents h 6= i that would help
agent i, while changes in any other tax would generate no external eﬀects on
i’s utility.
Corollary 2. At a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, for every
individual, i, and every commodity l 6= L, there exist real numbers λih,k , for
h 6= i, such that
P

h6=i

P

h6=i

P

k

P

i
k λh,k

∂ x̃h
k
∂tl

=1

∂ x̃h

λih,k ∂tmk = 0,

m 6= l, L.

P
Proof From the last corollary, the matrix Dt x̃ has rank L−1. But i Dt x̃i =
0. It follows that if all the rows corresponding to any individual were removed,
the resulting sub-matrix M −i would also has rank L − 1.
The matrix M −i has full column rank if and only if, for each column M −i ,
−i
there is a vector, λil , such that λil · Ml−i = 1, while λil · Mm
= 0 for every
other column m 6= l.
¥

5

Separable Externalities

Externalities are separable if the consumption of others, x−i , does not aﬀect
the marginal utility of an individual’s own consumption.
With separable externalities, the utility function of an individual is defined by
XX
ui (xi , x−i ) = u∗i (xi ) +
λih,l xhl ,
h6=i
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l

where u∗i is the private utility function of the individual defined over his own
consumption, xi , while the vector λi = (. . . , λih,l , . . .), h 6= i, is the vector of
external eﬀects on i.
If λih,l > 0, the consumption of commodity l by individual h has a positive
external eﬀect on individual i; if λih,l < 0, the external eﬀect is negative; if
λih,l = 0, there is no external eﬀect.
The profile of external eﬀects is λ = (λ1 , . . . , λi , . . . , λI ).
An economy with separable externalties is described by the vector (u∗ , e, λ).
The private utility functions u∗ of individuals will be held fixed as in previous
Sections. (We assume the utilities satisfy the same smoothness conditions 12 defined in Section 2). Economies are then indexed by (e, λ), the allocation
of endowments and the profile of external eﬀects, and the set of economies
L(I−1)I
is E × Λ = RLI
, an open set in Euclidean space of dimension
++ × R
IL + IL(I − 1).
With separable externalities, there is an economy without external eﬀects
associated unambiguously with an economy with externalities; it obtains by
setting λ = 0.
Competitive t-equilibria in the externalities economy (u∗ , e, λ) coincide
with competitive t-equilibria for the associated economy (u∗ , e) without the
external eﬀects because the separable externalities do not aﬀect the choices of
individuals. Hence the definition of regular economy and regular equilibrium
need not change.
Lemma 3. At a regular competitive equilibrium with full trade (but without
commodity taxes), the infinitesimal change in the utility of each individual
due to an infinitesimal change in taxes is smooth and
dui = Dt ui dt = (−μ̃i (x̃i − ei )0 Dt p̃ − μ̃i (x̃i − ei )0+ + μ̃i Dt τ̃ + λi Dt x̃−i )dt.
Proof This is a simple extension of Roy’s identity. The first term is the
eﬀect of the induced change in prices on wealth, multiplied by the marginal
utility of revenue; the second and third terms are the direct eﬀect of the
change in taxes on wealth, multiplied by the marginal utility of wealth; the
last term is the external eﬀect caused by the induced change in consumption of individuals h 6= i. By the envelope theorem, the changes in utility
caused via the reoptimization of own consumption, xi , and the change in the
marginal utility of revenue, μi , are of second order and can be dropped. ¥
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5.1

Pareto improving taxes

When there are no externalities, it can be shown that after normalizing utilities properly, no tax package can raise the sum of utilities. We now show
that with separable externalities, generically, every competitive equilibrium
can be Pareto improved upon by commodity taxes and anonymous transfers. A key step in the proof is to show that for generic endowments and
externalities, no matter what weights π = (π 1 , ..., π I ) ∈ S I−1 are used on the
utilities, there will be some tax package that does increase the π-weighted
sum of utilities.
Proposition 1. In the class of smooth economies with separable externalities
and I < L, generically, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved
by anonymous commodity taxes and transfers.
Proof We saw in Lemma 1 that for fixed smooth utilities u∗ , there is
a generic set E ∗ of allocations of endowments such that every Walrasian
economy with e ∈ E ∗ is regular, and every Walrasian equilibrium of e has
full trade (every individual trades every commodity). In fact the argument
we gave shows that the set
M = {(p, x, μ, e) : (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy e ∈ E ∗ }
is a smooth manifold of dimension IL.
Define the function
G : M × RIL(I−1) × S I−1 → RL−1
by
G(x, μ, p, e, λ, π) = πDt u =

P

i

π i Dt ui ,

where Dt u = (Dt u1 , . . . , Dt ui , . . . , Dt uI ) is a matrix of dimensions I ×(L−1),
and π = (π1 , . . . , π i , . . . π I ) is an element of the sphere of dimension I − 1.
G denotes the change in the π-weighted sum of utilities that can be wrought
with each tax.
According to Corollary 2, by appropriately perturbing λ, one can perturb
each entry duh /dtk , leaving dui /dtl = 0, for all i 6= h and l 6= k. Since some
πi 6= 0, Dλ G has full row rank L − 1. Hence G t 0.
It follows that G−1 (0) is a manifold of dimension IL + IL(I − 1) + (I −
1) − (L − 1) : if I < L, then this is less than IL + IL(I − 1).
17

Define the projection
IL(I−1)
G−1 (0) →proj RIL
= E∗ × Λ
++ × R

by
(x, μ, p, e, λ) →proj (e, λ).

By Sard’s theorem 4 , the set (E ∗ × Λ)∗ of regular values of the projection has
IL(I−1)
full measure in RIL
; from the boundary behavior of the Walrasian
++ × R
excess demand function, the projection is proper and, as a consequence, the
set (E ∗ × Λ)∗ of regular values is open. In other words, (E ∗ × Λ)∗ is generic.
Since the domain of the projection has a lower dimension than the range,
an economy, (e, λ) is a regular value of the projection if and only if it is
not in the image of the projection, i.e. (e, λ) 6∈ G−1 (0). Thus for any economy in the generic set (E ∗ × Λ)∗ , at every one of its Walrasian equilibria,
there is no solution to the system of equations πDt u = 0; equivalently, the
matrix Dt u has full row rank, I. Thus there is an infinitesimal tax package dt with Dt udt >> 0. It follows that every Walrasian equilibrium can be
Pareto improved upon by some commodity tax package, dt (and the associated anonymous transfer of revenue).
¥

6

Example

Individuals are i = 1, 2, and commodities are l = 1, 2, 3.
The utility function of an individual is
i
i
−i
−i
ui (xi , x−i ) = u∗i (xi ) + λi−i,1 x−i
1 + λ−i,2 x2 + λ−i,3 x3 ,

where λi = (λi−i,1 , λi−i,2 λi−i,3 ) are the coeﬃcients of external eﬀects and
1
1
u∗i (xi ) = xi1 − αi1 (xi1 )2 + xi2 − αi2 (xi2 )2 + xi3 ,
2
2

0 < αi1 , αi2 < 1

is the private utility function over own consumption.
Externalities are separable
The endowments of individuals are
e1 = (1, 0, e13 ) and e2 = (0, 1, e23 ),
4

Abraham and Robin (1967, thm. 5.1)
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respectively, with the endowment in commodity l = 3 suﬃciently large.
Prices of commodities are p = (p1 , p2 , 1), and tax rates on commodities
are t = (t1 , t2 , 0); commodity l = 3 is numéraire and not subject to taxation.
Assuming external eﬀects that are separable from the marginal utility of
each individual’s own consumption allows for competitive equilibrium prices
and allocations, with or without taxes, that are independent of the coeﬃcients of external eﬀects.
The quasi-linearity of the utility functions in the numéraire commodity
eliminates income eﬀects and facilitates computations.
Competitive equilibrium prices are easily calculated to be
p1 (t) = 1 − ( α11 +

1
)(1
α21

+

1
t ),
α21 1

p2 (t) = 1 − ( α11 +

1
)(1
α22

+

1
t ),
α12 2

1

2

and equilibrium allocations are
x11 (t) =

1
(α21
α11 +α21

+ t1 ),

x12 (t) =

1
(α22
α12 +α22

− t2 ),

x13 (t) = e13 + p1 (t)x21 (t) − (p2 (t) + t2 )x12 (t) + 12 (t1 x21 (t) + t2 x12 (t)),
x21 (t) =

1
(α11
α11 +α21

− t1 ),

x22 (t) =

1
(α12
α12 +α22

+ t2 ),

x23 (t) = e23 + p2 (t)x12 (t) − (p1 (t) + t1 )x21 (t) + 12 (t1 x21 (t) + t2 x12 (t)).
By direct computation,
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⎛

⎛
⎜
⎝

Dt u = ⎝
α11 (α21 −α11 )
2(α11 +α21 )2
α11 (α11 −α21 )
2(α11 +α21 )2

Dt u1
2

Dt u

⎞

⎛

⎠=⎝

∂u1
∂t1

∂u1
∂t2

∂u1

∂u1

∂t1

∂t2

⎞

⎠=

+ λ12,1 α1−1
+ λ12,3
+α2

α22 (α22 −α12 )
2(α11 +α21 )2

1
1
+ λ12,2 α1 +α
2 + λ2,3

2
1
+ λ21,1 α1 +α
2 + λ1,3

α22 (α12 −α12 )
2(α11 +α21 )2

+ λ21,2 α1−1
+ λ21,3
+α2

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

⎞

⎟
⎠.

In the absence of external eﬀects, for λ = 0, the matrix Dt u is singular,
in particular Dt u1 + Dt u2 = 0, and Pareto improving taxes do not exist; the
Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Pareto improving taxes dt, that solve (Dt u)dt À 0, exist if the matrix
Dt u has full row rank.
1
Since the coeﬃcients αi +α
j are all non-zero (in fact, all positive), it is
k

clear that by perturbing the variables λi−i,l one can perturb the matrix in
any way desired. Thus the matrix Dt u is invertible for almost all choices of
the externality variables λi−i,l .
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Notation
•

0

is the transpose.

• A vector a = (. . . , ak , . . .), is non-negative: a ≥ 0, if ak ≥ 0, for every
k; it is positive: a > 0, if ak ≥ 0, for every k, with strict inequality,
ak > 0, for some; it is strictly positive: a À 0, if ak > 0, for every k;
analogously, the vector a is non-positive: a ≤ 0, negative: a < 0, and
strictly negative: a ¿ 0. For vectors a and b, a ≥ b if (a − b) ≥ 0,
a > b if (a − b) > 0, and a À b if (a − b) À 0; analogously, (a − b) ≤ 0,
(a − b) < 0, and (a − b) ¿ 0.
• For a, a real number, a+ = max{a, 0}, and a− = − min{a, 0}; for
a = (. . . , ak , . . .), vector, a+ = (. . . , ak+ , . . .), and a− = (. . . , ak− , . . .).
•

k

is Eucleidean space of dimension k – for simplicity, one writes for
; the non-negative orthant is k+ , and its interior, the strictly positive
orthant, is k++ .

1

• S k is the sphere of dimension k; its intersection with the non-negative
k
orthant is S+k , and with the strictly positive orthant S++
.
• [ ] is the span of a collection of vectors or the column span of a matrix.
• If g, is a function of (. . . , yk , . . .), then “gyk ” is the function defined by
gyk (. . . , yk−1 , yk+1 , . . .) = g(. . . , yk−1 , yk , yk+1 , . . .).
• Dy g is the gradient of a function, g, with respect to y – for simplicity,
one writes Dg; if y = (. . . , yk , . . .)0 , then
Dy g = (. . . ,
if g = (. . . , gl , . . .)0 , then

∂g
, . . .);
∂yk
⎛

⎜
⎜
⎜
Dy g = (. . . , Dyk g, . . .) = ⎜
⎜ ...
⎜
⎝

is the Jacobean matrix.
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..
.
∂gl
∂yk

..
.

⎞

... ⎟
⎟
⎟
... ⎟
⎟.
⎟
⎠

• Dy2 g is the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of a function, g, with
respect to y – for simplicity, one writes D2 g; if y = (. . . , yk , . . .)0 , then
⎛
⎞
..
.
...
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟
∂2g
2
⎜
Dy g = ⎜ . . . ∂yk yk . . . ⎟
⎟.
1
2
⎜
⎟
⎝
⎠
..
.
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